This article presents a statistical approach to assess the coherence of official results of referendum processes. The statistical analysis described is divided in four phases, according to the methodology used and the corresponding results: (1) Initial Study, (2) Quantification of irregular certificates of election, (3) Identification of irregular voting centers and (4) Estimation of recall referendum results. The technique of cluster analysis is applied to address the issue of heterogeneity of the parishes with respect to their political preferences.
Background
On August 15th, 2004, Venezuelan citizens went to the polls to vote in the Recall Referendum on the presidency of Hugo Chávez.
The "Consejo Nacional Electoral" (CNE-National Electoral Council), the government institution in charge of regulating and executing any/all electoral processes, officially declared that 59% of the voters had voted in favor of President Chávez (NO votes) and 41% of voters had voted against (YES votes) .
However, the veracity of these results has been seriously questioned by members of the Opposition. Within this context, the purpose of this study is to present a statistical approach designed to assess the coherence of the official results of the presidential recall referendum process.
Scope of data
The data used was the official result for the recall referendum, published by the CNE and quoted in Table 1 . The table describes the distribution (i.e., yes, no or null) of total votes followed by a breakdown per municipalities, parishes, voting centers, and certificates of election. Since it was allowed to vote overseas there were 62 virtual municipalities and 96 virtual parishes, usually associated with a Venezuelan embassy or consular office in different countries. A mixed voting system (computerized and manual) was used in this referendum process. Of the total votes, 87% were cast through voting machines and the remaining 13% through manual procedures. It is interesting to mention that when the voting process was officially closed in each voting machine, the results were transmitted first to the tabulation center (CNE), and then, all the pertaining counting documents (certificates of election) were printed in the voting centers. After that, the manual certificates were sent to the CNE with the printed documents.
Statistical Methodology
The statistical analysis described in this study is divided in four phases, according to the methodology used and the corresponding results, as follows: 3.1. Initial Study; 3.2. Quantification of irregular certificates of election; 3.3. Identification of irregular voting centers and 3.4. Estimation of recall referendum results.
Initial Study
This phase of analysis is based on the testing, for each voting center, of the following hypothesis: at the certificate of election level, there are no significant differences in % of YES votes amongst the various certificates of election in a center.
Since each voter is assigned at random to a certificate of election (computerized or manual), it can be stated that each certificate of election is a random sample of the voting center population. Therefore, significant differences are not expected among certificates of election within a center and the severity of the suggested test is very high. However, there are few certificates of election (samples) per center, which makes irregular voting patterns difficult to identify with high levels of confidence. In this context, if inconsistencies show up in the official data published by the CNE, the above hypothesis can be rejected.
The statistical analysis to be performed (Mood, 1974) can determine if the data prove or disprove this hypothesis. Firstly, estimated %YES/NO votes were calculated for the binomial referendum process using the normal approximation (Feller, 1973) for the voting population at the voting center level (8, 335) . We may use this normal approximation to the binomial distribution when the estimated value of %YES/NO votes is not extreme and the estimated mean is not too small. Secondly, confidence intervals were estimated for different levels of significance. Thirdly, certificates of election with vote patterns not contained in the confidence intervals were rejected as irregular.
The following example illustrates the methodology: if there are 450 votes in a certificate of election, belonging to a voting center where the YES obtained 50% of the votes, it is expected with 95% confidence that there are between 204 and 246 YES votes.
If the results from the certificate of election was 190 YES, it can be stated that the certificate of election is irregular, since the result is below the calculated minimum indicating that this certificate of election could be sub valuated; if the results from the certificate of election was 260 YES, it can be stated that the certificate of election is irregular, since the result is above the calculated maximum indicating that other certificates of election could be sub valuated; and if the result from the certificate of election was 225 YES, the certificate of election is accepted.
Results

Initial Study
At 99% confidence level, the results for the hypothesis tested are that the Percentage of Rejected Certificates of Election is (1%) and the Number of Rejected Certificates of election is (263). These results do not indicate major inconsistencies in the official data at the level of voting center. For this reason, further analysis at the Parish level will be performed, after the heterogeneity of the parishes with respect to the political preferences is disscused in tables 2 and 3. The calculated parameters induce the description of the 1,228 parishes in the 3x3 contingency table 3. The information included in Tables 2 and 3 imply that 60% of the votes were found to be associated to parishes with an average heterogeneity greater than 9%. In this context, we decided a reasonable approach would be to subdivide the parishes by using the Minimum Heterogeneity distance for clustering analysis.
. Quantification of irregular certificates of election
The Minimum Heterogeneity distance (MINH) is defined as the estimated standard deviation of the % of YES votes at the level of certificates of election within a parish. It guarantees that no certificate of election is rejected under the assumption that all the certificates have the same expected % of YES votes.
Accordingly, MINH is calculated by MINH = Square root (P*(1-P)/N), where P is the % of YES votes in the parish and N is the greatest number of votes per certificate of election in a parish.
Then, MINH Average = 2.1 %, MINH Std Deviation = 0.7 % MINH Maximum = 3.2 % (few votes, % very similar), MINH Minimum = 1.3 % (many votes, % very different)
The second phase of the analysis is used to quantify irregular certificates of election:
1. Parishes are subdivided, according to their heterogeneity in clusters as discussed by (Sokal, 1973) and (Press, 1982) , until the heterogeneity of each cluster is equal or less than the MINH of the cluster. (Homogeneous and Quasi-homogeneous)
2. For each of the clusters, using its complete set of certificates of election, the probability that the % of YES votes in the certificates have different expected values is calculated using Chi-square (Choi, 1978) . This probability (P i ) is assigned to each cluster.
3. Given that the parishes were subdivided to the maximum possible in step 1, then independence is assumed for Chi-squared random variables from step 2. Furthermore, performing Bernoulli trials with variable probability (Feller, 1973 ):
R i = 1 with probability P i ; R i = 0 with probability (1-P i ) where R i : is the random variable cluster (i) is rejected N i : is the number of certificates of election in cluster (i) For an illustration of the methodology, Steps 2 and 3 of the methodology are illustrated in table 6 for parish La Candelaria and Figure 1 . summarizes the frequency distribution of rejection probabilities for the resultant clusters. 
REJECTION PROBABILITY % OF VOTING CENTERS
Biased centers core F R Using the number of Rejected certificates of election, with the maximum subdivision of parishes, we have:
• Expected (Rejected certificates of el
• Standard Deviation (Rejected certificates of election) = 198
With the extreme binding implied by the subdivision applied, the number of rejected certificates of election is contained within the interval (MIN: 5,251, MAX: 6,271). The probability of falling outside of this interval is 1%.
This result rigorously narrows the process of subdividing the parishes in clusters (Homogeneous and Quasi-homogeneous) for the next phase.
Identification of irregular voting centers
The purpose of this section is to identify irregular voting centers using the following methodology:
1. Parishes are subdivided into analysis clusters (Press, 1982) such that the resultant average heterogeneity is contained within the minimum heterogeneity interval determined in section 3.2.
2. The hypothesis "The certificates of election of the resultant clusters (Homogeneous, Quasi-Homogeneous) have the same expected % of YES votes" is tested.
3. Clusters (subsets of centers within a parish), where the hypothesis is not accepted, are rejected.
For an illustration of the methodology, The example presented in Table 9 shows the result of steps 2 and 3 for Parish La Candelaria. Even though significant differences exist between the certificates of election in the voting center, the center can only be rejected with a confidence level of 73.4%. This is mainly caused by the existence of very few samples (certificates of election) by cluster.
Results
The consolidated results for hypothesis testing "The certificates of election of the resultant clusters (Homogeneous, Quasi-Homogeneous) have the same expected % of YES votes", using the resultant clusters of table 8 are shown in table 10 both for computerized and manual certificates of election. Table 11 shows the results for the computerized subset of certificates and table 12 for the manual subset. 
Estimation of recall referendum results
In this section the following data is used to estimate Referendum results: 
Results
Table 13
Result To illustrate the strength of the methodology applied in sections 3.3 and 3.4, we present the relationship between the % of YES votes and the rejection probabilities of the resultant clusters in Figure 2 . The dimension % of votes is added to provide the size of the population at each point. 
CERTIFICATES OF ELECTION
Figure 2. % YES votes vs. % Rejection Probabilities
In this context, using votes in clusters with probability of rejection less than or equal to 10%, the estimate % of YES votes equals 56,4% with the unbiased 20% of the population.
As observed from Figure 2 . the % of YES votes continuously decreases as the rejection probability increases, therefore it can be stated that there is a very strong inverse correlation between the two variables. This is a crucial statistical finding, which means that the % NO votes have higher rejection probabilities than the % of YES votes in all the intervals (0%-100%).
Conclusions
The statistical approach introduced in the preceding sections to assess the coherence of official results of a recall referendum, can be applied in practice to any binomial electoral process (p,1-p). For the Venezuelan case study under analysis, we now summarize our findings: 4.1. Initial Study When comparing the voting patterns of different certificates of election within a voting center, only 1% shows irregularities at this level.
Quantification of irregular certificates of election
The expected value and standard deviation of the random variable R (number of rejected certificates of election) were calculated using the maximum subdivision of parishes in clusters (subsets of centers within a parish). The resultant interval of irregular certificates of election falls between 5,251 and 6,271 with probability 99%, this represents between 22,2% and 26,5% of the total of certificates of election.
Identification of irregular voting centers
When comparing the voting patterns of certificates of election within clusters, it can be stated that 18% of the voting centers show an irregular voting pattern in their certificates of election. The votes corresponding to this irregularity are around 2,550,000 in number, and are mainly (68%) related to the NO option of the presidential referendum.
Estimation of recall referendum results
The result estimates for the %YES votes in the referendum fall between 52.2% and 59.7% regarding the representative population and the results by type of the electoral certificate.
Within this context, it is relevant to mention that the proposed statistical approach was powerful enough to identify irregular voting centers because bias was not homogeneous within parishes. The annexes of this paper provide the lists of Rejected Centers, Unbiased Centers and Other Centers according to the computed rejection probabilities.
Finally, these findings lead us to conclude that the Venezuelan opposition has statistical evidence to reject the official results given by the CNE. The irregularities detected were observed consistently in numerous voting centers and the magnitude of the irregularities imply that the official results do not reflect the intention of voters with statistical confidence.
Note: The authors can provide the annexes List of Rejected Centers, List of Unbiased Centers and List of Other Centers for further research studies on request.
Résumé
Cet article présente une approche statistique pour dégager une cohérence des résultats officiels des processus du référendum. L'analyse statistique décrite se divise en quatre phases, selon la méthodologie utilisée et les résultats qui correspondent:
(1) Étude initiale, (2) La quantification des certificats d'élection irréguliers, (3) L'identification des centres de suffrage irréguliers et (4) Estimation des résultats d´appel de referendum. La technique d'analyse de grappes est utilisée pour traiter le problème d'hétérogénéité des paroisses en relation avec leurs préférences politiques.
Le cas d'étude choisi pour appliquer la méthodologie proposée est le référendum vénézuélien de l'année 2004. Les données utilisées comme point de référence sont celles publiées par le CNE (Conseil National Electoral). Les conclusions de cette étude se résument comme suit : Le pourcentage des certificats d'élection irréguliers est entre 22,2% et 26,5% du total ; 18% des bureaux de vote montrent un patron irrégulier de vote dans les certificats d'élection; les votes irréguliers sont environs 2.550.000; le résultat estimé, en utilisant les votes impartiaux comme représentatifs de la population dans le pourcentage de votes OUI contre le président Chavez est de 56,4% en comparaison avec le résultat officiel de 41%.
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